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Abstract Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 establishes the European Labour Authority
(ELA) as a decentralised operational EU-agency. The ELA has to help individuals
and businesses to get most out of the opportunities offered by free movement and to
ensure fair labour mobility. According to the Commission, it will serve the double
mission of helping national authorities to fight fraud and abuse and making mobility
easier for citizens. This article addresses existing problems with labour mobility and
analyses reasons for insufficient compliance with local standards and other enforce-
ment problems. The author reflects on the added value and future functioning of the
ELA.
Keywords Labour mobility · Labour standards · European Labour Authority ·
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1 Introduction
In his 2017 State of the Union Address, delivered at the European Parliament in
September 2017, European Commission President Juncker announced plans to es-
tablish a new European agency, the European Labour Authority (hereafter the ELA),
in order to foster fair mobility in Europe.1
1Juncker stated that it is ‘absurd to have a Banking Authority to police banking standards, but no com-
mon Labour Authority for ensuring fairness in our single market.’ https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm.
B J. Cremers
1 Senior researcher, Tilburg Law School, Cobbenhagenlaan 221, 5037 DB Tilburg, The
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The negotiations between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
on the proposal, which was launched by the Commission in March 2018, ended in the
first half of 2019. Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 establishes the office as a decentralised
operational agency. The ELA has to help individuals and businesses to get the most
out of the opportunities offered by free movement and to ensure fair labour mobility.
According to the Commission, it will serve the double mission of helping national
authorities fight fraud and abuse and making mobility easy for citizens. The ELA
will become operational as of 2020: the inauguration ceremony took place in October
2019.2
According to the concluded legal text, the European Labour Authority will sup-
port Member States in providing information and services to citizens and business,
facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information between Member States, and
support them through concerted and joint inspections in order to fight abuse, fraud
and undeclared work. The ELA will also carry out the role of mediating between
Member States in cases of disputes. The agency will pool and integrate numerous
existing EU tools and structures, both by taking them over and by replacing them.
The European Labour Authority has a board that consists of one representative of all
Member States as well as representatives from the European social partners and the
European Parliament. Moreover, the ELA will install a broader stakeholder-group in
order to have a regular input from practitioners in industrial relations.3
This article addresses the following issues after providing some background infor-
mation:
• existing problems with labour mobility—an analysis of the reasons for the in-
sufficient enforcement of the law and other problems (confronting both the EU and
the Member States);
• the core business and the added value of the ELA (e.g., coverage of all rele-
vant topics, existing structures and tools, new structures and services, pooling, more
comprehensive services and synergies); and
• challenges and risks (e.g., gaps, new interfaces, overlaps, complexity, feasibility
and resource issues). It also provides a
• short summary and outlook.
1.1 Some background information
The ELA’s objective is to promote fairness and help strengthen trust in the Single
Market, and ‘to help individuals and businesses to get most out of the opportunities
offered by free movement and to ensure fair labour mobility.’ To that effect, the ELA
should support the Member States and the Commission in strengthening access to
information about rights and obligations in cross-border labour mobility situations
and facilitating the solution of cross-border labour market disputes or irregularities.
Cross-border activity by workers has increased as a result of migration, whilst the
creation of the Single Market has led to intensified temporary labour mobility. Mo-
bile EU citizens move nowadays mainly for employment-related reasons. However,
2https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=9477.
3https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2019:186:FULL&from=EN.
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Fig. 1 Data on labour mobility in the EU
labour mobility in the EU is not new. The principle of free movement of workers is en-
shrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
and goes back to the earliest principles established in the European Economic Com-
munity in 1957.4 According to that philosophy, citizens’ rights to work in another
Member State are grounded on the lex loci laboris, or the regulatory framework of
the country where the work is performed. This first type of rights-based labour mo-
bility is increasingly supplemented with temporary labour mobility of posted workers
based on the freedom to provide cross-border services and the freedom of establish-
ment (see Fig. 1).
The recent past has shown that the instruments to inform workers about their rights
are spread over too many disciplines, whilst checking for irregularities in the social
domain and verifying the lawfulness of mobility are restricted by territorial borders
and by limited national competences.5 As a result, the information that mobile work-
ers have regarding their rights is fragmented. Moreover, national compliance and en-
forcement authorities face an array of constraints and problems, and control of com-
pliance with rights-based mobility is therefore hampered. Studies have uncovered the
work of questionable legal entities, operating in a cross-border context, breaching
rules, with regime-shopping and the use of regulatory arbitrage leading to impunity.
The experience of inspectors is that fines are weak in an extra-territorial context.
Scholars have signalled a lack of effective penalties as social fraud is still not re-
garded a major offence justifying a European-wide sanction (Cremers [3], Bernaciak
[1], ETUC [6]).
4The 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community contained several provisions
to ensure free movement of workers (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Articles 48–51). Free movement of workers
meant in particular that workers who were nationals of one Member State had the right to go to another
Member State to seek employment and to work there.




Table 1 Identified abuses related to labour mobility (author’s compilation)
Working conditions/wages Social security abuses
Business model based on evasion of pay and
other wage components
Business model based on application of low
social security contributions
Non-compliance with minimum pay,
collectively agreed wages & working
conditions
Falsification of A1-form / non-registration
in the home country / underpay of
contributions
Underpayment and/or too low scaling /
serious mismatch with skill level
Uninsured workforce / excessively low
benefits / pensions
Non-payment of overtime bonuses and other
allowances; no overtime compensation
Contribution (in the country of registration)
based on excessively low factual
remuneration; overtime & other wage
components not included
Unjustified deductions for lodging and
transport
Unlawful deductions/double pay slips
Blurred labour relations Bogus self-employment
1.2 Dealing with labour mobility problems
Compliance control related to labour mobility is regulated in several intertwined ar-
eas. On the one hand, competences to decide on and to control compliance with the
regulatory framework of pay and working conditions, social security and tax obliga-
tions stem from principles and rights enshrined in EU and national legislation (in the
labour, social security and fiscal domain). On the other hand, these competences re-
late to provisions in agreements resulting from collective bargaining. Table 1 provides
a non-exhaustive list of problems that can be encountered in this area (the author’s
own compilation). What do we know about the functioning of actual information and
enforcement practices?
Experience shows that, as soon as a transnational dimension is introduced on lo-
cal labour markets, compliance control is hampered in most of these areas. In recent
decades, this became manifest in several industries, first of all in labour-intensive
industries such as construction, manufacturing, shipbuilding, transport and logistics,
but in the meantime also in all kinds of services. The use of a foreign (artificial) en-
tity in a cross-border context can lead to the introduction of questionable forms of
labour recruitment, with blurred labour relations, the circumvention of social secu-
rity payments and tax evasion. Freedom of establishment and the free provision of
services serve in this context as a breeding ground for artificial arrangements (such
as letterbox companies), as these freedoms provide unrestricted entry to European
Union Member States’ labour markets (Sørensen [8], ETUC [6]). In this paragraph,
research results in the area of cross-border mobility, posting of workers and transna-
tional recruitment in the frame of the free movement are briefly listed (largely based
on Cremers [5]).
In 2003, a first assessment of the implementation of the Posted Workers Directive
(hereafter PWD) examined both the legal context and the practical functioning of
the Directive in the framework of the free provision of services. The conclusion was
that Member States had hardly developed measures to ensure compliance with the
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posting rules. The responsible national institutions and offices suffered from a lack
of staff and competences were too dispersed to guarantee effective control. Verifying
the genuine application of labour regulations proved to be arduous. For instance, the
fact that under the applicable rules for the coordination of social security, the deci-
sive authority regarding whether a person was employed or self-employed was the
sending state, whereas under the Posted Workers Directive, it was the receiving state,
caused misunderstandings and a lack of clarity. Checking whether the undertaking
in the home country was a genuine undertaking, and pursuing substantial economic
operations on a stable basis was very difficult. Host countries had to rely entirely
on information of the country of the registered office—and the crucial cooperation
and mutual exchange needed in this area were absent. The inspectorates had serious
problems in controlling whether posting was just workforce supply or in fact service
provision based on a commercial contract.6
These findings turned out to be representative of later experiences of the compli-
ance and enforcement offices and the inspectorate. A further investigation in 2010,
across twelve countries—with a focus on social and economic disparities between
formal legislative or conventional rights and real wages and remuneration, working
time, paid leave, living conditions and health and safety—found cross-border recruit-
ment methods ranging from genuine long-established partnerships between contract-
ing partners to completely fake letterbox practices of labour-only recruitment. As
regards enforcement practices, competences were spread between too many institu-
tions, the division of labour in one country did not match the division in another and
national cooperation between the different institutions involved (i.e., revenue authori-
ties, social security authorities and labour inspectorates) was often lacking. Compared
to the 2003 study, the report identified even greater divergences in transposition and
application.7
The Senior Labour Inspectors Committee (SLIC) carried out a project in 2010–
2011 which arrived at comparable conclusions.8 The project’s aim was to improve
the manner in which information is exchanged between labour inspectorates and to
ensure enhanced cross border enforcement and mutual assistance in inspection and
sanctioning proceedings. The final consensus paper concluded that neither mutual
assistance nor cooperation between labour inspectors could rely on a complete and
common legal basis. Moreover, inspection services signalled a lack of national net-
working between all relevant compliance offices and authorities with information
spread over several instances, and with demarcations of and limitations to compe-
tences that differed in every Member State. The recommendation was to approve
mutual assistance at European level in order to ensure the mutual and reciprocal ex-
change of information and active cooperation among the regulatory authorities from
all the Member States. According to the Senior Labour Inspectors Committee this
could be reached by the creation of cross-border information systems, and the pro-







as in other parts of the acquis. Evidence resulting from this cooperation should have
the same legal value as evidence obtained from national investigations and the execu-
tion of all financial penalties should be guaranteed, in order to enhance cross-border
enforcement practices.9
A series of projects, led by the French Institut National du Travail, de l’Emploi et
de la Formation Professionnelle (INTEFP), organised pilots with joint investigations
and exchanges between the inspectorate, social partner organisations, liaison offices
and other relevant national actors.10 The experiences underlined the necessity of en-
hanced cooperation between all stakeholders (i.e., the responsible public bodies from
all over Europe and social partners). As regards labour mobility in general and the
posting of workers in the framework of the free service provision in particular, the
project results showed that control of the regularity and the collection of evidence
and supporting documents were hindered by fragmented competences and a lack of
mandate in the host country. The results raised the question where competence lies
for overall compliance control of the regular character of cross-border labour mobil-
ity. Deficient competences became manifest as soon as activities referred, rightly or
wrongly, to labour mobility in the frame of the freedom of establishment (in another
constituency), the contract freedom and the freedom to provide services.11
Research in the Netherlands, on the enhanced control and enforcement of labour
standards and working conditions, underpinned the problematic relationship between
the working conditions of workers involved in temporary cross-border activities and
the free provision of services. The research pointed to the decisive importance of
the competences and the operational mandate of involved actors and institutions in a
cross-border context.12
A project, led by the Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture (CVEK)
in Bratislava, analysed patterns of labour migration and mobility in the Visegrad
countries (V4), with a special focus on the labour mobility of third country work-
ers.13 According to the researchers, official data on labour migration was lacking
or severely understated (Čaněk and Kall [2]). Institutions had no explicitly defined
mandate to tackle labour exploitation or labour rights violations of migrant workers.
The capacity of labour inspectorates to investigate labour rights violations was lim-
ited because documents provided by employers were the only source of information
they could rely on. Neither the linguistic skills of inspectors operating in the field nor
instruments were sufficient for a decent assessment.
In the above-cited research, it appears that the activities of most competent na-
tional authorities in the social field end at the border, as the mandate of control and
enforcement institutions is limited to the national territory. National competent en-
forcement and compliance authorities are unable to meet their obligations as soon
9http://www.empleo.gob.es/itss/ITSS/ITSS_Descargas/Sala_de_comunicaciones/Noticias/2011/adj_not_
20111122_7.pdf.
10During the course of the projects that run between 2010 and 2017, only Cyprus and the UK were not
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as transnational elements enter the picture. Barriers encountered in compliance ac-
tivities at national level often originate, on the one hand, in frictions between the
juridical frame that the internal market provides for service providers and foreign
establishments and the limited territorial mandate of the competent authorities. Ex-
isting national compliance arrangements which should protect workers’ interests are
not adapted to the challenges of enforcement in the internal market. Besides, the mon-
itoring of rules and regulations for cross-border labour mobility and the transnational
provision of services with foreign labour is hampered as competences are dispersed
over a series of national authorities. Problematic for all stakeholders in a compliance
campaign is the lack of effective sanctions. Fines are weak in an extra-territorial con-
text and most countries have no specific enforcement instruments related to labour
mobility. The fact that the tackling of artificial arrangements and of fraudulent cross-
border labour recruitment very often comes too late or that these practices can pop
up repeatedly, leads to serious frustrations. Competence to deregister fraudulent es-
tablishments lies outside the competences of compliance authorities and social fraud
is still not seen as a major offence that could justify a European-wide sanctioning
system.
Based on the practical experiences of the labour inspectorate and other compliance
and enforcement authorities, the above-cited researchers recommended that national
social and labour inspectors should step up their cooperation, with concerted joint
action by national compliance and enforcement authorities seen as key to the fight
against fraudulent practices with cross-border labour. Furthermore, the need to fully
provide national compliance authorities with competences to check jointly and inves-
tigate respect for applicable rules was frequently recommended. Thirdly, there was
reference to a need for more effective execution of sanctions (i.e., sanctions with a
transnational effect) in cross-border situations.
2 The core business of the ELA
In the debates which led to the adoption of the Regulation establishing the European
Labour Authority, experiences such as those listed above provided orientation in lay-
ing down the core business of the European Labour Authority—namely, improved
information provision, the combining of existing instruments relating to cross-border
labour mobility and the organisation of joint transnational control activities (Euro-
pean Commission 2018 [7]). At the moment of writing, ELA activities in these areas
can be summarised as follows.
2.1 Increased cooperation in the provision of information
The need for both increased and enhanced cooperation in the provision of informa-
tion has been underlined by several experts and practitioners. Such cooperation is
hampered by dispersed and fragmented national responsibilities and by related oper-
ational difficulties. Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 stipulates, in Article 5, the improve-
ment of the availability, quality and accessibility of information as a basic task of the
ELA. In its first meeting (17 October 2019) the ELA Management Board adopted a
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work programme and budget for the Authority for 2019, with a list of preparatory
activities, including the setting-up of a working group on information. Pursuant to
Article 5 (b) (c) (d) (e) of the founding Regulation, the ELA is to support Mem-
ber States in applying Regulation (EU) 2016/589, complying with obligations con-
cerning access to and dissemination of information relating to labour mobility and
social security coordination legislation, improving the accuracy, completeness and
user-friendliness of relevant information sources and services and streamlining the
provision of information and services to individuals and employers pertaining to
cross-border mobility. The working group has three main tasks: (i) to support the
mapping of sources of online information provision to citizens and employers at EU
and national level and to analyse information gaps, inconsistencies and action needs
on EU and national websites in the labour mobility domain; (ii) to advise the ELA
on possible means of support to Member States to carry out the activities established
by Article 5 (b) (c) (d) (e) of the founding Regulation, including through the devel-
opment of standard templates and the exchange of best practices between Member
States, and to discuss EU and national strategies on the dissemination of information
to citizens and employers.
2.2 Combining existing instruments related to cross-border labour mobility
Fragmented competences and excessively strong demarcations of mandates hinder
the effective tackling of breaches and abuses. Enforcement activities relating to labour
mobility problems and irregularities should combine existing national instruments
across all relevant and intertwined policy areas (social legislation, binding collective
agreements, social security and tax obligations), leading to the complementary func-
tioning of existing national compliance bodies. The Regulation provides, in several
articles, for the integration of some existing bodies (the Expert group on Posting, the
EURES European Coordination Office and the European Platform Tackling Unde-
clared Work) and a clearer division of labour between the ELA and other existing
institutions (for instance, the Administrative Commission on Social Security Coor-
dination). In its work programme for 2020, the ELA is set to start the preparations
for the smooth integration into the ELA in 2021 of the EURES European Coordi-
nation Office and the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work. The ELA will
incorporate over the course of 2020 and 2021 two existing EU bodies, the Technical
Committee on the Free Movement of Workers and the Committee of Experts on Post-
ing of Workers. With a view to develop the cooperation agreement mandated by the
Regulation (Article 13) the start of discussions with the Administrative Commission
on social security coordination is planned.
2.3 The organisation of joint transnational control activities
In the above-cited practical cases, it clearly appears with the mandate of control and
enforcement institutions limited to the national territory that the activities of most
competent national authorities in the social field end at the border. The competence
to check the reliability of documents which underpin cross-border activity and, if
necessary, to withdraw these documents, is missing. As most cases stem from situ-
ations based on EU internal market rules, such as EU freedom of establishment and
The European Labour Authority and rights-based labour mobility




– The Authority shall assist Member States and the Commission in
their effective application and enforcement of Union law related to
labour mobility across the Union and the coordination of social
security systems within the Union (Article 1.2).
– The objectives shall be to contribute to ensuring fair labour mobility
across the Union and assist Member States and the Commission in the
coordination of social security systems within the Union (Article 2),
– and (under Article 2.b) facilitate and enhance cooperation between
Member States in the enforcement of relevant Union law across the
Union, including facilitating concerted and joint inspections.
– If Member States refuse to cooperate, joint inspections will take
place only in the participating Member States (Article 8.3).
Competences in different
policy areas
– The Authority enjoys the most extensive legal capacity accorded to
legal persons under the national law of the Member States (Article 3.2).
– It shall facilitate cooperation and exchange between national
authorities (Article 4.b).
– Concerted, joint inspections are carried out in accordance with the
law or practice of the Member States in which the inspections take(s)
place (Article 9.2).
– Several existing structures will be integrated or the cooperation with
existing structures will be streamlined (recitals 11, 22, 42, 43, 44;
Articles 6, 12, 14).
Tackling of fraudulent
establishments
– If the Authority becomes aware of irregularities in areas of Union
law, it shall report to the Commission and the Member States (recital 8,
Article 9.9).
Sanctioning in an
extra-territorial context / The
EU-wide effect of sanctions
– The Authority shall facilitate and support cross-border enforcement
procedures relating to penalties and fines (Article 7.1.d).
An alert mechanism for
stakeholders
– Inspections should take place at the request of Member States or
upon their agreement to the Authority’s suggestion (recital 18).
– A request for concerted inspection has to come from one or more
Member States (Article 8.1).
– Social partner organisations at national level may bring cases to the
attention of the Authority (Article 8.1).
the free provision of services, a EU-legitimised mandate that can be performed by
national competent authorities in both the sending and the receiving country seems
appropriate. Problems related to labour mobility can only be effectively tackled by
an authorised institute with the mandate to exercise any or all of its powers across
the EU. Therefore, the ELA should have a broad mandate to detect and investigate,
with the competence to take all necessary enforcement measures to bring about the
cessation or prohibition of abuses. The authority should legitimise, monitor and su-
pervise the activities of the national compliance offices and instances. The Regulation
does not draw this ultimate conclusion (see Table 2). What it does is an inclusion of
the promotion of enhanced investigations that go beyond the competence limitations
in relevant policy areas, which exist in (some) Member States. In the founding Reg-
ulation (in Articles 8 and 9), the ELA is tasked with coordinating and supporting
concerted and joint inspections. The Authority will facilitate the conclusion of in-
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spection agreements specifying the terms and conditions of the inspections, and will
provide support for carrying out such inspections. However, this is subject to the prior
agreement of the participating Member States. In its work programme, the ELA has
foreseen the establishment of a working group in early 2020, with the task of defin-
ing the rules of procedure when carrying out cross-border inspections, discussing the
results and identifying further action needs. The working group will discuss coordi-
nation and cooperation arrangements with other relevant agencies or bodies.
3 Positive aspects, challenges and unsolved issues
Given the fact that the ELA started late October 2019 with a first ceremonial meeting
of the Management Board, a first assessment is of course very premature. But, based
on early assessments published by the author (Cremers [4] and [5]), some critical
remarks can be made.
3.1 Positive aspects
First of all, the Regulation recognises that enhanced enforcement is of the utmost rel-
evance for the functioning of the Single Market. Already in the first recital, reference
is made to the free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and the freedom
to provide services. Moreover, the Authority is not (only) an instrument relevant for
EU social policy, the activity of the ELA goes to the core of the functioning of the
Single Market as the ELA has to deal with the practical application of EU law. Article
9.7 of the Regulation talks about ‘suspected irregularities in the application of Union
law’.
Secondly, the Regulation recognises the problems of dispersed compliance and
enforcement activities at national and at EU-level. The EC realises that, as a result
of a fragmented division of labour between different national authorities and of in-
tertwined policy areas with different compliance traditions, problems with labour
mobility in general and with enforcement in particular can only be successful tackled
if the necessary activities take place across borders. Notions of concerted, integrated
and joint actions and inspections have a prominent role in Regulation. For this rea-
son, starting with concerted or joint inspections figures among the first priorities in
the current work programmes.
Thirdly and strongly related to this, consistency requires risk assessment, moni-
toring and investigations across disciplines. The ELA can provide a mechanism for
dialogue, conciliation and mediation, but it can also organise the exchange of avail-
able data and knowhow. This includes the exploration of synergies with other relevant
EU initiatives and networks. Article 10 of the Regulation specifies that the Authority
shall assess risks and carry out analyses regarding labour mobility and social security
coordination, on topics such as labour market imbalances, sector-specific challenges
and recurring problems.
Fourthly, the strengthening of the capacity of national authorities, combined with
intensified information provisions, is seen as a sine qua non for the promotion of
genuine cross-border labour mobility. The Authority has to provide operational as-
sistance, including practical guidelines and training.
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In brief, the necessity of capacity building and strengthening of national compli-
ance bodies have been underlined.
Finally, it is positive that an old demand of the Senior Labour Inspectors Com-
mittee has, to a certain extent, been met. Article 9.7 says that it shall be possible to
use information collected during concerted or joint inspections as evidence in legal
proceedings in the Member States concerned, in accordance with the law or practice
of the relevant Member State.
3.2 Challenges and unsolved issues
Some unsolved issues in the Regulation have to be mentioned here.
• The legal competences of the Authority
The scope of the ELA’s competences and the broader legal basis for its work are
only modestly reflected in the relevant articles of the Regulation. The original pro-
posal widened the scope to issues of EU law ‘beyond the scope of its competences’.
Reference to the right of establishment ‘under the conditions laid down for its own
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected’ (Article 49
TFEU) and to the freedom to provide services ‘under the same conditions as are im-
posed by that State on its own nationals’ (Article 57) would add core elements of the
Single Market acquis to the scope of the ELA. Based on the same reasoning, refer-
ence to the prevention of fraud and unfair competition, as formulated in several parts
of the acquis, could further broaden the scope of competences. For example, obli-
gations regarding administrative cooperation, stemming from Directive 2006/123/EC
of the European Parliament and the Council (Chapter VI), interfere directly in the
work of the Authority and, therefore, should be an integral part of the work of the
Authority.
• The ELA should facilitate joint inspections
Practical experiences with pilot joint inspection schemes have shed light on the short-
comings of actual cross-border enforcement and mutual assistance activities. The
Regulation stops halfway. It is provided that the evidence stemming from exchanged
information, mutual assistance and joint inquiries is legally validated in the involved
Member States. However, EU-wide authorisation and legitimisation is missing. The
ELA provides national compliance authorities with the right to organise and partici-
pate in cross-border actions and to set up teams. But beyond this, the mandate to act
jointly is not strengthened. There is no EU-wide mandate, comparable to the com-
petence in joint activities of other EU authorities (for instance, powers of inspection
and to engage in coordinated actions in the areas of anti-trust law or consumer pro-
tection). National compliance authorities that jointly carry out their duties should be
empowered to conduct, EU-wide, all necessary inspections of undertakings and re-
lated investigations.14
14Regulation (EC) No 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
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• Sanctioning and penalties
The ELA proposal will not lead to enhanced practice in fining policy. Article 7.1.d
speaks about the task of ‘facilitat[ing] and support[ing] cross-border enforcement
procedures of penalties and fines’. However, the internal market rules that regulate
the economic freedoms so far have few fining or redress mechanisms in the field of
cross-border activities. In research on cross-border labour mobility, it has been noted
that there is a lack of effective and dissuasive sanctions. And, for instance, based on
the Cibeles project, the Senior Labour Inspectors Committee had to conclude that
several kinds of penalties were not guaranteed in a transnational context. Moreover,
the detection of fraud or infringements in one Member State does not affect the com-
mencement of comparable fraudulent activities in another Member States. The fining
policy must fulfil two objectives: to punish and to deter. Breaches cause harm to the
economy and long-running breaches undermine the principles of free movement. The
least the ELA should do is to develop the main rules for an EU-wide fining policy
and for procedures in case of violation of the law.
• Mediation and dispute solving and relevant stakeholders
The mediation mechanism that is proposed is a step forward. However, several ques-
tions relating to mediation and dispute-solving are unclear. First, there is the question
of access. Given the broad range of national practices that exist in the area of control
and enforcement of labour market regularity, the applied procedure should be rela-
tively flexible and open. The regulatory frame for fair labour mobility is built up, on
the one hand, by the legislator (and at national level often based on tripartite consulta-
tive or advisory structures), on the other hand by the partners in collective bargaining.
Most Member States have installed a range of paritarian, sectoral or interprofessional
committees which have a mandate to step in as soon as there is an industrial dispute
or difference in interpreting agreements and other concluded provisions. These joint
bodies are most often composed of representatives of management and labour, and
have the task of preventing, solving and settling disputes and conflicts. Social part-
ners have established compliance institutions and counselling offices and cooperate
in targeted campaigns. Just like the compliance authorities established by the national
legislator, the mandate of these bodies ends at the national border. These stakeholders
should have the facility to request the Authority’s intervention, notably in situations
where labour legislation and legally-agreed working conditions are intertwined.
Another element that is unclear is the legal status of the Authority’s decisions and
dispute solutions. The decisions should be understood as decisions giving effect to
measures taken to bring about the cessation or the prohibition of an infringement.
4 In summary
The current work in the initial phase of the ELA is of course dominated by deliber-
ations on procedures and working methods, the recruitment and selection of appro-
priate staff and the establishment of premises. The planning is that the ELA become
operational in the course of 2020. However, looking beyond the heavy load of for-
malities that will dominate the agenda of the Management Board some reflections on
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the extension of the operational clout remain essential. In practical and operational
cooperation, the concerted joint action of national compliance and enforcement au-
thorities is key for the fight against fraudulent practices with cross-border labour
mobility. Currently, national compliance authorities lack the competences and legal
capacity to check and investigate respect for the applicable rules from a transnational
perspective. Moreover, demarcations between competences hinder adequate in-depth
compliance control activities. This is the area where the ELA has to demonstrate its
added value.
• The work of the European Labour Authority has to legitimise and enhance,
from a European perspective, the enforcement of rules and regulations in the Member
States. In order to contribute to this aim, the competences and legal capacities of na-
tional compliance offices and authorities need to be strengthened. A first step should
be the provision of an EU-wide authorisation to act in cases of irregularities that de-
mand EU-wide investigation. In concrete terms, in its activities the ELA will have
to provide the joint work of national authorities with cross-border legal capacities.
The Authority must take all necessary measures to enable officials from the involved
Member States to play an effective role in joint activities. To that end, national offi-
cials must be authorised to carry out the duties entrusted to them with the same power
as the officials from the Authority.
• In line with this approach, the Authority has to pave the way for an integrated
approach. The ELA’s activities must make an end to dispersed compliance and en-
forcement activities at national and EU level. The combined tasks related to matters
relating to cross-border labour mobility and the coordination of social security should
be complemented with legislative areas not previously covered, such as the genuine
provision of services. To this end, it is logical to integrate the tackling of artificial ar-
rangements (related to the freedom of establishment) and cooperation stemming from
the fight against fraudulent service providers (chapter VI—the Service Directive) into
the Authority’s scope of activities.
• The ELA needs to work towards the improvement of fining policy in the area of
cross-border breaches of the law. It should lay down the main rules for an EU-wide
fining policy and for procedures in case of violations. The Authority has to work out
sanction mechanisms, such as the power to suspend activities and take down web-
sites of fraudulent actors, to impose interim measures for widespread infringements
with a Union dimension, and to impose penalties proportionate to the cross-border
dimension of the practice in question.
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